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 Abstract 
 
The effects of Syrian migration in Europe have revolutionized refugee resettlement 
globally. Most immigration and refugee problems have historically been settled similarly post 
WWII, however, Syria is the largest refugee crisis since WWII. It is important to learn how to 
respond to future conflicts with displacement and resettlement affecting Western countries that 
are unprepared to respond to a conflict of such magnitude. This thesis will compare previous 
conflicts and the Syrian conflict, while highlighting the resilient political momentum of 
reactionary new political groups in European states, particularly Germany and Austria.  
The research and results from this study will include data from government bodies, 
international organizations, and research institutions to depict how the Syrian conflict has 
directly caused popularization of anti-immigrant views amongst political parties in Germany and 
Austria. The results and recommendations will be useful for migration policy development and 
management of refugees after great conflicts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
©2019 by Sara Kouchehbagh 
All Rights Reserved
  
Table of Contents 
Chapter One: Introduction 
 
Chapter Two: Literature Review 
 
2.1 The response of EU states to preceding major refugee producing 
conflicts……………………………………………………………………………………4 
 
2.1.1 Yugoslav Wars……………………………………………………………... 4 
2.1.2 Gulf War……………………………………………………........................ 5 
2.1.3 Origins of the international refugee regime post-WWII……………….……6 
2.2 Background of the Syrian Conflict……………………………………………………7 
2.3 Defining Migration Crises and Forced Migration………………………………….. 10 
2.4 Perspectives on Migration Policy: How Migration Transforms Societies………….. 11 
2.5 Labor Markets and Migration: Comparison of Responses to the Syrian Refugee 
Crisis………………………………………………………….……………………….....13 
2.6 European Response to Syrian Refugees…………………………….……………….14 
2.6.1 Non-European Countries that Host the Most and Least Syrian Refugees: 
Turkey and the United States……………………………………………….……16 
2.7 The Syrian Conflict’s Effect on PRR Groups………………………………………. 17 
2.8 Who Votes for PRR and Why?................................................................................... 18 
2.9 Germany’s PRR Group- Alternative für Deutschland (AfD)………………………. 22 
2.9.1 AfD and Right-Wing Party Voter Distribution…………………………….25 
2.10 Austria’s PRR Group- Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP)…………………………… 31
  
Chapter Three: Methodology 
 
 3.1 Data Analysis of PRR Popularity in Germany and Austria through Maps…………..34 
 
 3.2 Data Analysis and Result ……………………………………………………………37  
 
Chapter Four: Analysis and Recommendations 
 
 4.1 Gastarbeiter (Guest Worker) Agreements Reapplied in the 21st Century ………….. 38 
  
4.1.1 Guest Worker Agreements and Migration Policy Recommendations:  
Case of New Zealand …...…………………………………………………….…39 
 
4.1.2 Skill Sensitive Recommendations for Future Migration Policies …………41 
 
 4.2 Private Funding of Refugee Resettlement: Case of Canada ……………………….. 43 
 
Chapter Five: Conclusion ………………………………………………………………….…. 46 
 
References Cited ………………………………………………………………………….…… 47 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 List of Figures 
Figure               Page 
2.1 Number of Syrian Displaced Persons and Durable Solutions…………………….……. ..8 
2.2 Displaced Syrians Globally according to the Pew Research Centre………………….... ..9 
2.3 Syrian Nationals Applying for Asylum in Europe by Year and Quarter……………… 15 
2.4 Constituency Seats Won by Party in the 2017 Election in Germany…………………... 26 
2.5 AfD Share of Vote in the 2017 Election in Germany………………………..................... 27 
2.6 The Ratio of Foreigners Relative to the Total Population of Germany………………... 29 
2.7 Map Representing the Unemployment Rate in Germany in 2013……………………... 30 
2.8 Percentage of Votes for the NPD Party in Germany in 2013………………………….... 31 
3.1 German General Election Results for the AfD Party…………………………………… 35 
3.2 Results of the Austrian General Election………………………………………………… 36 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  1
Chapter One: 
Introduction 
The Syrian conflict which began in March 2011 has created the largest number of displaced 
persons since World War II (UNHCR 2017). This displacement has created unprecedented 
difficulties for Syrians, neighboring countries, as well as Europe and the remaining Western 
hemisphere. It is therefore important to examine the effects that mass migration and refugee 
resettlement have on political movements and parties in host countries. The rise of anti-
immigration rhetoric amongst political parties in European countries has steadily risen since the 
early years of the Syrian conflict. As of 2018, over 6.1 million Syrians have been internally 
displaced, and an additional 5-6 million are refugees. The European Union (EU) hosts about 1 
million of the 5-6 million Syrian refugees, furthermore Germany is the EU member state that 
resettles the majority of Syrians living within the EU (Kumar, et. al 2018). 
 
Prior to the Syrian conflict, Western and Central European countries, alongside the United 
States, hosted multiple waves of refugees and migrants throughout the 20th century. World War 
II resulted in the largest of these waves between the years 1945 and 1970, when immigrant 
families fled to host countries as a result of conflict. After a brief fall in migration due to 
economic issues in the 1970s that resulted in stricter migration policies, migration to Europe rose 
once in again in the 21st century as a result of conflicts in the Middle East (Kentmen-Cin, et. al 
2017). Despite current migration, and prior migration that has resulted in first and second-
generation immigrants now living in Europe and the United States, there is an unprecedented 
effect that migration from the Syrian conflict has had on politics and society in Europe, 
particularly regarding immigration and refugee policies. Political parties have gained momentum 
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on the basis that they are anti-immigration or closed-border policy parties, and the attitudes and 
rhetoric toward Syrians and other immigrants after the start of the Syrian conflict in 2011 are 
now regularly discussed in the news and in daily political debates.  
 
Whether or not Syrian conflict related migration has a positive or negative impact on 
Germany and Austria’s society and development is rationalized through policy discussion, 
formation and enforcement. These policies attempt to regulate migration issues, such as 
monitoring remittances, and aim to curb negative impacts of migration. Furthermore, global 
policies that regulate training, education, resettlement funds, and especially migrant returns, can 
be difficult to enforce. In turn, funds for policies should focus on improving infrastructure and 
legal security of migrants, which would allow migrants to have access to similar institutions and 
rights as citizens. Preferably, this would deter the migrants from falling into the all-too familiar 
trap of vulnerable poverty and low-skill working jobs, and would instead alleviate pressure and 
stimulate development.  
 
It is evident that in a globalizing world, migrants are key players in development related 
policies, as changes in policies can have a domino effect on two or more societies at a time. 
Germany and Austria’s current successes and failures should be examined through the lens of 
past policies and agreements involving mass migration, guest workers and refugee resettlement 
comprehensively in order for policies to improve in the future. In order for appropriate 
procedures to progress, data representing the impacts of past and current policies will be 
analyzed alongside the influence of Populist Radical Right (PRR) parties’ dogma to police 
Syrian migrants within Germany and Austria.  
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Some of the major actors amongst global political parties that have gained momentum since 
the start of the Syrian conflict include, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) in Germany, UK 
Independence Party (UKIP) in the UK, National Rally (National Front) in France, The Freedom 
Party (FPO) in Austria, Alliance of Young Democrats (Fidesz) in Hungary, and the Swiss 
People’s Party (SVP) in Switzerland. For the purpose of this research, I will focus on the AfD 
party in Germany and the FPO in Austria. Germany and Austria share similar experiences, 
language, culture, and history, and both countries also host more Syrian refugees than a majority 
of their EU counterparts (Connor 2018). 
 
The AfD and the FPO are both parties heavily involved in anti-immigration, populist policies 
with their rise to power coinciding with the first waves of migrants arriving to Europe from Syria 
after the start of the 2011 conflict. In the political sense, the populist policies of the AfD and the 
FPO refer to their belief in the political impact of the “average” majority versus holding political 
power among few powerful persons. This position can be attractive to middle class, working 
class citizens, or those who may feel neglected by a small, powerful group of people making 
impactful decisions in their government (de Vreese 2018). In order to effectively understand how 
these parties have gained power we must define the difference between a economically 
motivated migration and forced migration, examine past conflicts that have created migration 
crises, explain how migration affects societies and how PRR parties rise to power, and ultimately 
provide criticism and recommendations for how the EU can respond to the large number of 
Syrian migrants that continue to settle in Europe.  
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Chapter Two: 
Literature Review 
Historical Conflicts that Have Created Migration Crises 
2.1 The response of EU states to preceding major refugee producing conflicts 
2.1.1. Yugoslav Wars 
The crisis in the former Yugoslavia caused the largest wave of refugee resettlement in 
Europe in the 1980’s. At the time, national refugee determination procedures were heavily 
overburdened, and the elimination of internal borders within the EU meant that the policies of 
individual states were conditional and dependent on the border and migration policies of 
neighboring EU countries. Throughout the conflict, the EU did not admit many Yugoslav 
refugees, and countries such as Germany went as far as tightening their entry policies at the 
border. Countries that were closer in proximity to the conflict, such as Austria and Hungary, 
began adopting German style measures as well. The pattern of the rise and fall of lenient 
migration policies was repeated once again in 1993 during the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict. 
Despites these varying policies, some of the countries with the strictest policies at times were 
also the countries that hosted most of the refugees among Europe States. Germany hosted the 
most refugees reaching roughly 300,000 persons, followed by Austria with nearly 75,000 
persons (UNHCR 2017). These conflicts instigated a rise in aid and refugee assistance from 
international organizations, such as UNHCR, as the interest in migration and refugee flow 
became a serious priority for many countries. As a result of the migration concerns, an agenda 
promoting temporary resettlement by governments and international organizations began to 
emerge in political discourse and eventually trickle down into EU states’ migration dialogue, and 
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eventually policies. Ideally these measures meant that refugees would temporarily stay in EU 
states until the conflict in their home country had settled, in which then they would return. 
 
As with the Syrian conflict, the mass wave of migration due to the Yugoslav wars 
resulted in temporary or abrupt amendments to migration policies, otherwise, refugee status may 
not have been decided within a reasonable time. The Yugoslav wars differ from the Syrian 
conflict in the sense that migration and refugee related issues and statuses were primarily 
handled or directed by UNHCR and similar agencies. However, since the start of the Syrian 
conflict we have seen a rise of willing participation and expression regarding these matters by 
political parties and government bodies.  
 
2.1.2 Gulf War 
The three million refugees fleeing the Persian Gulf during the 1991 Gulf War fought 
between Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq and their oil producing neighbor state, Kuwait, left a 
massive humanitarian crisis. The minority groups most severely impacted by Saddam Hussein’s 
invasion included about 1.85 million Kurds and thousands of Shiite Muslims, who were then 
forced into neighboring countries such as Iran and Turkey (Galbraith 2003). The migration and 
refugee strategies and lessons learned that are now relevant to post-war conflicts because of the 
Gulf War, such as the Syrian conflict, include the importance of sectarian conflict, weapons of 
mass destruction, and the willingness of neighbor and distant states in accepting refugees in any 
given conflict. For example, according to the Migration Policy Institute, the Kurdish minority 
was the largest displaced group as a result of the Gulf War, and a number of Kurdish migrants 
bypassed UNHCR procedures in order to resettle in European countries. Because the Kurds were 
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largely anti-Saddam protestors, they had the support of many groups and states who also 
supported the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq. With this support, many of these migrants 
acquired fake documents or had connections to ease the burden of the expensive and often 
stressful resettlement procedures in Europe. 
 
2.1.3 Origins of the international refugee regime post-WWII  
 The first agencies managing cross-border migration on a global scale began after WWI. 
The International Labor Organization (ILO) was established in 1919 to protect the interests of 
workers outside their home countries, and two years later the High Commissioner for Refugees 
was established by the League of Nations (Redondo, 2018).  The establishment of the Permanent 
Migration Committee came about after the ILO began paying more attention to providing 
resources for migrant persons. Although the Committee was originally intended to handle labor 
issues, the outbreak of WWI and other conflicts meant that the urgency of refugee response was 
steadily rising. Political tensions and governmental interests caused a delay in the establishment 
of a permanent body to handle refugee issues, and it was not until WWII that refugee issues 
became a top priority for states. 
 
WWI and WWII resulted in different consequences throughout Europe, specifically, 
WWII resulted in a large movement of population within countries. Redondo states that the death 
count after WWII reached over 60 million, and the survivor count left anywhere between 30 to 
60 million people displaced. The term ‘refugee’ was used by the Allies to describe victims that 
fled the Nazis, whereas other groups were excluded. During this time the term refugee started to 
be associated with discrimination and opposition issues, and the terms refugee and displaced 
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person were often used interchangeably and incorrectly. After the War, the US led the search for 
assistance for the millions of displaced Europeans, but it was Belgian who initially gave shelter 
to 50,000 refugees providing them jobs as well. As other countries followed Belgian’s example, 
the US and Latin American countries also implemented similar measures. It was only in the 
1940’s that countries, including the US, began creating new agencies to safeguard and assist 
refuges worldwide. Agencies such as the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration were established, and the difference between refugees and displaced persons 
became significantly clearer. By 1951, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees was created due to the difficulty of unifying the management of human migrations 
between different agencies with different priorities.  
 
2.2 Background of the Syrian Conflict 
According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), the Syrian conflict’s 
inception in March of 2011 began with the Arab Spring protests that started in Tunisia and swept 
through much of the Arab region. Originally beginning as peaceful protests against Syrian 
leader, Bashar al-Assad, and the state descended into turmoil after protests became violent and it 
turned into an armed conflict. Syria has now become the largest refugee crisis since WWII, with 
the largest number of IDPs (Internally Displaced Person) worldwide and at least 40% of its entire 
population displaced internally. According to the IDMC, the remaining Syrian population 
seeking asylum or refuge includes about five million people throughout the Middle East, and 
roughly one million people in Europe.  
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The following include working definitions provided by UNHCR for IDPs, asylum 
seekers, and refugees: A refugee is defined as someone who is forced to leave their home 
country due to persecution, war or violence, leaving him or her with a fear for return because of 
racial, political, national, or religious social grouping. In contrast, an asylum seeker is strictly 
someone who flees their home country to seek sanctuary in another country (this is not 
necessarily due to ongoing war or violence). An internally displaced person is someone who has 
been forced to flee their home but have not entered another country by crossing a border 
(UNHCR 2019). Below are the IDMC’s figures for Syria displacement as of 2018: 
 
Figure 2.1: Number of Syrian Displaced Persons and Durable Solutions 
(Source: IDMC 2018) 
 
The IDMC holds government advances in Syria responsible for spikes in displacement 
figures for specific months between 2017 and 2018, such as in January, March, and June. 
However, it reports that as government advances increase overall there is a decrease in the 
number of displaced Syrians (IDMC 2018).  
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Alongside the IDMC, the Pew Research Center (PRC) also found that over six million 
Syrians were displaced within the state (PRC 2018). Below is the PRC’s estimated number of 
displaced Syrians globally in 2017. 
 
Figure 1.2: Displaced Syrians Globally according to the Pew Research Centre, 2017 
(Source: PRC 2018) 
 
The Syrian conflict is a humanitarian crisis, meaning a situation in which a widespread 
threat to health, life, or safety beyond the coping capacity of societies (Weerasinghe, et. al 2014). 
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The Syrian conflict is also a humanitarian crisis that is specifically triggered by armed conflict, 
political instability and public tensions. Although these triggers are often what is associated with 
major conflicts, they are not lone actors and there are usually underlying structural dynamics at 
play that affect the magnitude and direction of these conflicts. The Syrian conflict is a human 
made disaster that has resulted in a humanitarian disaster because of the allegations of the use of 
chemical weapons by the Assad regime, which produced the Organisation for the Prohibition of 
Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) established in 2014. According to UN 
and OPCW FFM reports conducted on ground, in 2018 it was confirmed that there was use of 
sarin and chlorine in Syria in the spring of 2017 (OPCW 2017). 
 
2.3 Defining Migration Crises and Forced Migration 
Still, a “crisis migration” resulting from a humanitarian crisis is a term coined to cover 
the sometimes-gray area of what defines voluntary and forced migration. Although many violent 
conflicts produce refugees and asylum seekers, it cannot always be determined who is directly 
fleeing conflict and who is not directly being driven out by conflict but instead chooses to leave 
because of economic strife due to conflict. 
 
International organizations have adopted clauses and terms based on their own definitions 
of migrants who voluntarily leave and those who are forced to leave due to conflict. For 
example, the 1951 UN Convention Status of Refugees defines refugees as persons who crossed 
international borders and are unable to return because of persecution or because they will have 
no protection in their home country and residence (UNHCR 1951 Refugee Convention). Other 
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organizations’ definitions extend the definition to include other reasons or groups of people, 
which is likely due to circumstances of regional relevance to an organization.  
For refugees and asylum seekers, the dynamics differ. Because of human rights 
violations, religious or ethnic persecution, or violence, many have no choice but to rush to 
neighboring countries for initial asylum resettlement (United Nations 2017). Only a small 
minority of those resettled in neighboring countries has the financial means, connections, or 
good fortune, to resettle in a more prosperous and secure country outside of their region, such as 
in the EU. This second migration movement for migrants is typically attractive for the long-term 
economic and social benefits associated with living in a EU state. Subsequently, failure or 
shortcomings in migration policy crafting can easily occur when distinctions between forced and 
economically migrations are not made, thereby missing the target population.  
 
2.4 Perspectives on Migration Policy: How Migration Transforms Societies 
Migration can be a very dangerous undertaking and difficult process for victims of 
conflict who often leave family and livelihoods behind for potentially life-threatening reasons. It 
is not uncommon from host country citizens to place blame on immigrants when the country 
goes through economic hardship or internal conflict; however, some people and political parties 
do overlook the advantages of migration in these times of despair. The advantages and 
contributions of migrants and their communities, including fill of labor shortages, business and 
trade stimulation, and an overall economic boom, are discounted (International Labour 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, et. al 2015). As a result, xenophobia, 
racism, and sometimes violent behavior and riots begin to swell in communities, thus creating 
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platforms for anti-immigration parties and increasing their chance of succeeding in local and 
national elections. 
 
It is critical for political parties to address how migration transforms societies in host 
countries economically and socially. It is unarguable that each conflict triggered migration wave 
throughout history has its own unique patterns; however, there is still space to make 
generalizations regarding social and economic impacts for host countries. The key in these 
generalizations is to distinguish post conflict migrations that are (1) economically motivated after 
conflict and (2) forced after conflict.  
 
An economically motivated migrant would likely be younger in age, seeking resettlement 
in an economically thriving country, and are typically ‘target-earners’ who want to save money 
in higher-wage economies for future economic or cost-effective opportunities (i.e. buying land, 
buying a home, dowries, education costs, etc.). Unlike forced migration, economically motivated 
migration encourages policy makers to include temporary status or recognition of the willingness 
of migrants to return to their home country. However, it largely accounts for situations that 
include migrants who have intentions of returning home in order to be near family, a similar 
culture, and to live a more comfortable life financially. The other group of economically 
motivated migrants stays in a circular migration cycle, in which migrants will either leave and 
return, or attempt to have their spouses, family, or friends join them in the host country. Usually 
with childbirths and longer stays the latter group is generally more inclined to permanently settle.  
The powerful and ever-changing dynamics of different migration processes can heavily 
affect policy makers’ resolutions as well as their pace of policy-based work. Initially, migrants 
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do not typically make a decision to migrate permanently or settle down for tens of years. 
However, regardless of their legal status or original reason of migration; migrant communities 
eventually strengthen in number and become self-sustaining, which in turn makes it harder for 
governments to enforce new migration policies and encourage return. The idea that migration 
could potentially be turned on and off, like a switch, is not a realistic grasp of migration patterns 
historically. The anti-immigration parties in Europe that support the idea of a migration ‘kill 
switch’ are not considering the aforementioned points. Looking at the 20th and 21st century, there 
is a consistency that democratic countries with strong legal systems, such as those in Western 
and Central Europe, are unable to prevent temporary migration from turning into permanent 
settlements, and this needs to be addressed by future policy makers.  
 
2.5 Labor markets and Migration: Comparison of Responses to the Syrian Refugee Crisis 
According to the Pew Research Center (Figure 2), nearly six million Syrians are 
displaced within Syria (PRC 2018). Within Syria alone the International Displacement 
Monitoring Centre ranked it as the country with the highest number of IDPs worldwide in 2018 
with at least 40% of its entire population displaced internally. The remaining Syrian population 
seeking asylum or refuge includes about five million people throughout the Middle East, and 
roughly one million people in Europe.  
 
Between 2011 and 2014 nearly 12 million Syrians were either internally displaced or fled 
Syria due to the violent conflict between Bashar al-Assad and Syrian based forces. This conflict 
has sparked a serious refugee crisis that has significantly affected the communities in many 
countries, primarily in the Middle East, and as far as the Western hemisphere. This section will 
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examine the financial cost and burdens placed on Syrian refugee hosting countries, and how their 
varying policies and actions in response to the conflict have created either effective or ineffective 
results within their borders.  
 
The Journal on Migration and Human Security assessed the policies and results of the 
United Kingdom, the United States, Sweden and Germany in response to the Syrian refugee 
crisis. In comparison to the Middle East, the actions and steps taken by European nations and the 
Western counterparts are relatively trivial given the actions and policies taken by countries such 
as Turkey, Jordan, Iran and Lebanon. Ostrand puts forward recommendations that would lighten 
the burden for countries in the Middle East, however, for this paper I will focus on the second 
recommendation that concerns how European countries can make a greater impact in the process 
of refugee resettlement and why there should be an increase in refugee resettlement according to 
the understanding of UNHCR data from 2014 (Ostrand 2015). Ostrand examines the policies and 
actions of the United Kingdom, the United States, Sweden and Germany due to the high number 
of annual asylum seekers that are accepted by the aforementioned countries. Although UNHCR 
reported that the United States ranks among the top five asylum receiving countries in the world, 
it is imperative to note that this does not include Syrian refugees.  
 
2.6 European Response to Syrian Refugees  
            The Migration Policy Centre at the European University Institute, Florence, focuses their 
research on how migration affects European states. They reported in 2014 what procedures and 
recommendations European states should undertake regarding the Syrian refugee crisis. The 
paper includes three major routes and modes of transport that Syrian refugees who are fleeing the 
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region into Europe usually take. This includes, (1) a land route to Bulgaria or Greece, (2) an air 
route to an EU state, (3) a sea route to a Mediterranean Sea bordering state (i.e. Italy, Greece, 
Spain, etc.). In all likeliness, those choosing the air route typically have family abroad and are 
exercising their right to obtain a tourist or visiting visa. It is migrants who have no European 
connections that typically take sea or land routes to the nearest European state. The Syrians 
living within Europe then belong to one of three categories of migrants: (1) asylum seekers, (2) 
visiting travelers, and (3) irregular migrants (Fargues, et. Al 2012). Unfortunately, the EU has 
focused a majority of their statistical resources on the first group. UNHCR has reported that 
given the magnitude of the Syrian conflict, the numbers of reported asylum cases in the EU are 
remarkably low. Below is a graph depicting the rise in asylum requests after the start of the 
conflict between 2011 and 2012.  
Figure 2.3: Syrian Nationals Applying for Asylum in Europe by Year and Quarter,  
2010-2012 
(Source: Fargues, et. al 2012) 
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According to the Centre, the handful of countries in Europe that have experienced the 
impact of Syrian refugees the most are Germany and Sweden, with the UK and Austria following 
far behind yet ahead of the remaining European states. As Germany and Sweden are two of the 
European states that have dealt with a majority of Syrian asylum request, the rise of PRR groups 
in these countries will be compared next to states such as the UK and Austria. For the purpose of 
this paper, the UK will still be included as part of the European Union as the withdrawal 
agreement has been extended until October 2019 (Wheeler, et. al 2019). 
 
2.6.1. Non-European Countries that Host the Most and Least Syrian refugees: Turkey and 
the United States 
As mentioned, countries in the Middle East, particularly Turkey, receive and accept one 
of the largest numbers of Syrian refugees across the globe. This migration wave has left Turkey 
with economic, political, and social consequences as the number of Syrian refugees in Turkey 
climbed to 1.7 million in 2015 and later 3.6 million in May 2019 according to the government of 
Turkey (UNHCR Operation Portal). 
 
In comparison to Turkey, North America lags in accepting Syrian refugees or asylum 
seekers. It is estimated that only 1% of displaced Syrians have been resettled in the North 
American continent. However, countries such as Canada and the United States have had very 
different experiences accepting displaced Syrians since the start of the conflict. Whereas Canada 
has accepted nearly 52,000 displaced Syrians since 2012, the United States has only accepted 
less than half this amount at an estimated 21,000 persons according to the Pew Research Centre. 
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2.7 The Syrian Conflict’s Effect on PRR Groups 
Despite migration numbers to the EU dropping after 2015, the rise of populist leaders 
gained momentum in EU states (HRW 2019). Many of the growing political parties that hold 
anti-immigration views encourage methods that include fear of violence and economic issues for 
host countries, as well as sparking patriotism or nationalism in communities. The rise of these 
populist leaders was originally perceived to publicly undermine EU standings and objectives 
without affecting policy, however, more recently these rising political groups have slowly won 
seats at local and national elections and their influence in policy making at the national and 
European level must now be deliberated.  
 
In 2018, the Human Rights Watch World Report disclosed that anti-immigration parties 
in countries including Italy, Hungary, and Austria continue to dominate the migration debate 
despite a decline in overall migration. These disagreements on how to handle migration issues 
within the EU have resulted in the blocking of agreements on EU asylum reforms and laws. 
These disagreements have directly affected the distribution and processing procedures for 
migrants and asylum seekers who enter the EU. Instead of moving forward with agreements, the 
focus has shifted to methods of keeping migrants and asylum seekers out of the EU. Many 
proposals from these countries supporting anti-immigration plans for the EU have included 
unrealistic and impractical measures, including problematic offshore processing, migration 
partnerships with non-EU states that typically have fewer resources to offer, unclear human 
rights records, and the inability to process claims.  
 
  18
 Mostly due to problematic migration coordination, the Human Rights Watch reported that 
roughly 65,000 fewer people arrived to the EU in 2018 when compared to the registered arrivals 
in 2017. Regardless, some EU countries such as Belgium have continued their development of 
family immigration detention centers for migrant families, and instances of racist or violent hate 
crimes continue in Bulgaria, Slovakia, Spain, France, Greece, Hungary, Germany, Italy and the 
UK.   
Despite numbers of Syrian migrants migrating to the EU dropping after 2015, the rise of 
populist leaders gained momentum in EU states (HRW 2019). Many of the growing political 
parties that hold anti-immigration views encourage methods that include fear of migrant violence 
and new economic issues in host countries, as well as sparking renewed patriotism or 
nationalism within communities no longer content with the sitting government, such as Poland’s 
populist government prior to 2018 and Germany’s AfD party as stated in their manifesto. 
 
The rise of these populist leaders was originally perceived to publicly undermine EU 
standings and objectives without effecting policy, however, more recently these rising political 
groups have slowly won seats in local and national elections and their influence in policy making 
at the national and European level must now be considered. 
 
2.8 Who Votes for PRR and Why? 
According to research, supporters and condoners of many PRR parties justify their stance 
based on open or closed borders and immigration issues. Many far-right supporters are self-
defined nationalists potentially threatened by international competition or globalization 
(Rooduijn 2015). The Eurosceptic position embraces their nativist view and it is undeniable that 
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the social and political situation of a country either diminishes or escalates support for such 
parties. The success of these parties relies on the legitimization of them in the media, politics, 
and society. The conversation and debate over relevant topics such as immigration, social 
changes, and unemployment has legitimized their status through political involvement so that 
any democratic state would be unable to turn them away. PRR parties have been around decades 
prior to the rise of far-right leaders and conflicts such as the Syrian War, however their rise only 
began in the 1990s and their global significance occurred in the 21st century. In Europe, the 
significance of these parties occurred after the 2014 elections for European Parliament. 
According to Matthijs, during this year Europe saw an average of 25% of votes supporting far 
right parties in the EU.  
 
Before delving into why the populist anti-immigration radical right parties are relevant to 
the anti-immigration politics of the EU, it is important to clarify what types of parties fall into 
this category. In the 1990s and early 2000s there was an unclear labeling and a ‘gray area’ of 
what classifies a supporter of a far right populist group, so in 2004 a Dutch political scientist 
named Cas Mudde coined the term, ‘populist radical right’ as a catch all for political parties that 
incorporate xenophobic, anti-immigration, and nationalist appeal (Mudde 2007). Since 2007, this 
term is the conventional description and distinction between populist far right groups and other 
political parties in the realm of migration policy and international migration discussions. Mudde 
describes these groups as inherently nativist, identified as, ‘an ideology, which holds that states 
should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (“the nation”) and that 
nonnative elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogeneous 
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nation-state’ (Mudde 2007, 19). Which in turn would mean that immigrant communities and 
waves of migration would threaten the beliefs of these right-wing political groups.  
 
Secondly, PRR groups characteristically are also interested in continuing or establishing a 
strict and orderly society via an authoritarian leader. This means that there is a heavy emphasis 
on law, order, and penalties for violations. Lastly, populism is a third pillar of PRR groups. In 
this case, populism within PRR groups reflects the exploitation of good people by an ‘evil’ elite. 
Often the ‘evil’ elite shifts around according to current political issues, and there is rarely a clear 
structure to who falls in this category and who does not, so political, economic, and social elite 
may all find themselves in similar situations at one point or another. 
 
Although these three pillars are central to many PRR groups, a fourth pillar, which is key 
to European politics and policies, is the criticism of European unification and open borders. The 
Eurosceptic viewpoint fits into the PRR rhetoric and appeals to citizens who are more concerned 
with migration issues in recent news, particularly after the previously mentioned spike in 
migration in 2014-2015 after the Syrian conflict. This pillar believes many of a state’s or EU’s 
failures lay at the hands of bureaucratic leaders who do not have the citizens’ best interests at 
heart, and instead respond to the needs of other elitists. There are always exceptions, such as the 
Vlaams Belang party in Belgium that does not criticize European unification, so it is not an 
absolute requirement for PRR groups to be Eurosceptic, however, a majority hold this belief.  
 
Another common, but not necessary, characteristic of PRR groups is the shared 
commonality of ‘othering’ elitist or capitalist groups. Vieten describers the term ‘othering’ as a 
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way to blame out-groups and as an, “ ideological maneuver that obfuscates the real causes of 
economic crisis that lie within the tendencies towards periodical crisis within the social relations 
of capital itself” (p.534, Vieten, et. al 2016). He describers PRR groups, specifically right-wing 
nationalist groups with anti-immigration platforms, as scapegoating the Other instead of the true 
cause of a migration crisis that is affecting a migrant-hosting state. He goes as far as to compare 
the parties’ obsessions with migration after the inception of the Syrian conflict with German 
propaganda where non-Jewish Germans blamed German Jews during 1930s German Nazism. 
Prior to German Nazism, in the 1920s communists and socialists were targets for economic and 
social blame within Germany. The blame put on wealthy or middle-class intellectuals in the 20th 
century has also found its way to 21st century political discourse among PRR groups. It is a cycle 
that repeats itself. 
 
Vieten makes an excellent point describing how conflict or tragedy, such as financial 
recessions or violent warfare, can drastically change the course of politics allowing for PRR 
groups to rise in popularity. These dramatic shifts in a society may influence citizens, who 
otherwise would not support a PRR group, to shift their thinking and begin to agree with some of 
their ideologies. It is difficult for many people in the 21st century to grasp the idea of how Adolf 
Hitler could have risen to power and how his far-right populist group could have gained political 
seats in Germany, but it must be considered that Germany was suffering tremendously 
economically and jobs were scare. The German people were in a highly vulnerable situation 
allowing for an excellent opportunity for an authoritarian leader to step in as an innovative 
frontrunner by appearance. 
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2.9 Germany’s PRR Group- Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) 
Between 2011 and 2017 over 500,000 Syrians travelled to Germany to seek asylum 
status, ranking it as the country with the fifth largest displaced Syrian population in the world 
(PRC 2018). However, the economic and migration issues that plagued so many nations in the 
21st century affected Germany to a far lesser extent. Still many Germans have since begun to 
show their support for a withdrawal from many Eurozone related issues and the idea of having 
closed borders and a more rigorous migration process for incoming refugees and migrants has 
gained momentum. The Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) is Germany’s first Eurosceptic party 
that has steadily gained a larger fan base due to its core skepticism toward economic and social 
integration in Europe. The party claims that this skepticism is not in fact new, and it is only due 
to recent events that the German people are finally coming around to the idea of addressing 
negative impacts of migration and integration. Grimm argues that the rise of the AfD is not only 
because of recent migration flow, but also due to the lack of alternate political choice in the 2017 
elections. European financial issues paired with conflict and migration flow into European states 
created a panic amongst German nationals, which ultimately led to AfD’s success in the 2017 
election.  
 
After the global economic crisis in 2008, the German economy continued to grow despite 
serious financial setbacks for other countries. The 2008 financial crisis left countries such as 
Turkey, Greece and Spain with severe debt, unemployment rates and housing market concerns, 
whereas Germany experienced some of the lowest impacts due to money lent to them from the 
international market. Despite Germany’s relative success after 2008, Eurosceptic sentiment still 
began to rise in the local and national levels (Grimm 2015). Although in 2019 there began a large 
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anti-immigration sentiment by the AfD, in the initial 2013 general elections the AfD gained 4.7% 
of the vote on issues such as the inefficiency of the euro as a single currency, as well as other 
bailout policies. Following the 2013 elections, in 2014 the AfD continued to rise in the polls with 
a 7% hold in the European Parliament. This election win meant AfD would send seven party 
members of the European Parliament to France.  
 
It is important to note that regardless of the global or continental circumstances that 
contribute to the rise of anti-immigration rhetoric and parties, in Germany this was also a result 
of the decline in popularity for other mainstream political groups. The AfD successfully 
marketed their group as proof of a democratic deficit in Germany, and when other center or 
leftist groups criticized AfD policies and stances, the AfD used the conversation to shed light on 
the stigmatization of the radical right in a democratic Germany post-World War II. This concept 
that it is “them versus us” or the “big man versus the little man” naturally appealed to many 
people who felt neglected by German politicians in office and by established political parties. A 
2009 representative survey in Germany found that over 75% of respondents were proud of the 
German heritage and were no longer plagued with guilt over their past history (Identity 
Foundation 2009). This survey represents what potential impact the return of national pride 
amongst German nationals can contribute to, including patriotism and nationalism. The AfD 
consistently uses words such as bravery and courage to promote party values, again appealing to 
Germans who feel neglected, unrepresented, and disempowered in German and European 
politics. Overall, the combination of a new sense of pride and patriotism alongside and 
dissatisfaction with German politics and the lack of options in elections created a strong platform 
for the AfD. 
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Since 2014, the AfD expanded its reach and established an updated manifesto written in 
both English and German. Many points are mentioned in the 2016 manifesto published online by 
the AfD party under Chapter nine entitled, “Immigration, Integration, and Asylum.” The AfD 
introduced the migration subject by initially mentioning that asylum and immigration in 
Germany are too based in political correctness and that negative developments in the field are 
not properly addressed (and instead covered up by ruling political parties). The AfD demands 
that freedom of speech to voice a controversial opinion be respected, and for Germany to begin 
concluding its global image as an immigrant safe haven. The AfD demands a tighter grip in 
Germany regarding the number of asylum seekers, free movement within the EU, labor related 
immigration, as well as overall immigrant integration (Alternative for Germany 2016). Although 
the AfD does not directly mention the Syrian conflict, they do make a point to highlight “a target 
of mass migration as seen in 2015,” referring to the wave of Syrian migrants in Germany. The 
AfD states that the current German and European asylum and refugee policies are unsuitable and 
unprepared to handle the mass migration that will continue from the African and Middle East 
region. Regarding asylum immigration, the AfD believes that if there is not an ongoing war in 
the country of origin, the migrant must leave Germany as their protected status will be 
terminated and they will receive no protection from Germany. Regarding migration policies, the 
AfD recommends that regional centers and shelters (i.e. neighboring countries) take care of 
migrants under UN and EU mandates. 
 
If executed successfully, the AfD’s measures effecting migration policy and refugee 
resettlement includes stricter German border control whilst assisting in the development of 
regional centers and shelters for migrants fleeing conflict, verifying identities of migrants and 
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preventing political influence of quotas, to distinctly separate highly skilled immigrants with 
asylum seekers in the migration process.  
 
The relationship between AfD’s proposed measures in the manifesto and organizations, 
such as the UN, who handle global migration issues now intersect on multiple levels. The AfD 
has proposed that the UN be reformed in its manifesto. 
 
2.9.1. AfD and Right-Wing Party Voter Distribution 
The figures that follow depict the (a) constituency seats won by party, followed by (b) the AfD 
share of vote, for the 2019 EU parliament election in Germany. 
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Figure 2.4: Constituency Seats Won by Party in the 2017 Election in Germany 
(Source: The Federal Returning Officer 2019) 
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Figure 2.5: AfD Share of Vote in the 2019 EU Parliament Election in Germany 
(Source: The Federal Returning Officer 2019) 
 
There is a well-defined relationship between the election results and the long-term effects 
of an East and West Germany despite reunification. Post-socialist conditions in east German 
states and the issues after reunification were not properly addressed thus creating the foundation 
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for AfD to thrive in the 2010s (Stenning, et al 2008). The severe unemployment rates at the time 
of reunification were never dealt with properly, and major companies to this day are not 
headquartered in the east German states. As population numbers have dwindled in the east, this 
is not the case in the west where the population is growing steadily. East German states that 
continue to rely on pre-reunification period jobs in a post socialist era, such as coal mining, have 
seen the highest numbers of AfD support. Unaddressed economic troubles paired with no 
established alternative for Germans in the eastern states have led to high numbers of AfD 
support.  
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The figures below depict the polarizing effect of an East and West Germany despite 
nearly thirty years passing since its reunification, and the contributing factors to the rise of the 
AfD in East Germany. 
Figure 2.6: The Ratio of Foreigners Relative to the Total Population of Germany in 2011.  
(Source: Navigation und Service 2019), map by Rick Noack) 
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Figure 2.7: Map Representing the Unemployment Rate in Germany in 2013.  
(Source: Navigation und Service 2019), map by Rick Noack) 
 
The low unemployment rate and fear of migration and foreign-born population in East 
Germany is a deeply rooted issue tracing back to the lasting effects of denazification and the fall 
of the Berlin wall. The aforementioned AfD manifesto addresses these specific issues that 
concern much of East Germany, including migration and economic recession, and are therefore 
able to attract voters and gain momentum. Ultimately, the results of these divides can be seen in 
the election results as depicted in the figure below, where NPD, a right-wing party, has gained 
more votes in East Germany than in West Germany. 
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Figure 2.8: Percentage of Votes for the NPD Party in Germany in 2013 
(Source: Navigation und Service 2019), map by Rick Noack) 
 
2.10 Austria’s PRR Group- Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) 
As an EU member state, Austria has experienced many changes in its political landscape 
since 2015. In Austria, a new government coalition combined the values of two existing parties, 
namely the conservative Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) and the far-right Freedom Party of 
Austria (FPÖ) (Kostic 2018). This new coalition primarily prides itself on addressing and solving 
the European refugee crisis stemming from Middle East conflicts throughout the 21st century. As 
a country weakened by conflict and still recovering from Nazi rule in the mid 20th century, the 
Austrian political party FPO began to rise in popularity in the 1980s (Betz 1993). Prior to this, 
the traditional political parties only included OVP and the Social-Democrats (SPÖ). It is due to 
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years of economic, political, and social changes that caused these two parties to fall from 
popularity. Between the 1960s and 1990s, polling of Austrian political allegiances and party 
support showed a continual decline in either support for peoples’ original parties, or many chose 
to answer that they did not support any party. By the 1990s, both parties had lost nearly one third 
of their supporters as confidence in elected officials began to end (Ulrike, et. al 2016).  
 
Unlike Germany and Austria’s other European counterparts who have seen a rise in PRR 
groups, the FPO held positions of power prior to 21st century migration and conflict issues that 
sparked the popularity of these groups. The FPO controlled office in 2000-2007, and only 
resigned to the opposing moderate leaders after pressure from mild sanctions the party produced 
that had affected FPO’s popularity in Austria. It is important to include here that neither 
Germany nor other European countries such as the UK experienced a PRR group rise to power 
and hold office soon after World War II, so Austria is unique in the sense that PRR groups are 
not a new concept to state and society. 
Similar to other European states, the rise of PRR groups is largely due to distrust and 
dissatisfaction of the current political establishment and response to issues, and in this case, the 
1990s showed to be the opportune moment for a PRR group to rise to power. 
 
The FPO rebranded itself and appealed to time sensitive and current issues in order to 
gain support and notice. At first, the FPO presented itself as a “youthful” and modern choice to 
the already established “old” parties. Countries such as Austria that have deep-rooted history and 
affiliation with the Nazi regime have typically tried to maintain a neutral status after 1955. 
However, after Austria joined the EU things began to shift, and the political establishment no 
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longer worried about the image of Austria within Europe. Despite EU warnings, Austria did not 
condemn or discipline far right FPO activities and eventually they gained votes and ministerial 
posts. In the late 1980s, Jorg Haider replaced Norbert Steger as FPO Chairman. It was not until 
Haider’s takeover of the FPO that foreigners in Austria became a central topic of discussion.  
 
Prior to Haider, the “immigrant issue” was not a concern for FPO supporters (Pelinka 
2017). Haider’s takeover of the FPO made way for one of the first examples of what is now 
common practice in PRR speech making. When referring to Austria’s Nazi past, Haider neither 
clearly condemned nor condoned it, and often made remarks that left much to the imagination 
with unclear intention or meaning. According to Pelinka, this method of ‘tiptoe’ speaking to 
address topics such as racial, religious, or migration issues allows for leaders to present their 
PRR group as a brand-new party to market, instead of an extension of an older, nationalistic 
political party, while not making clear offenses.  
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Chapter Three: 
 
Methodology 
 
3.1. Data Analysis of PRR Popularity in Germany and Austria through Maps 
 
The methods used in this research study are conventional to geography, and consist of 
cartographic work, collection of government data, and an analysis of the result (Woolstencroft 
1980). The maps used display basic geographic knowledge of the German and Austrian region 
and how the Syrian conflict has impacted the political landscape of these regions and their 
provinces through election results. 
 
A total of four maps were used. One depicts AfD support in Germany prior to 2015, and 
the second depicts AfD support after 2015. Pre and post-2015 was chosen as the year that 
Germany experienced the largest migration wave of Syrians to date. The third map depicts FPO 
support in Austria prior to 2015, and the second depicts FPO support after 2015. Again, pre and 
post-2015 was chosen as the year that Austria experienced the largest migration wave of Syrians 
to date.   
 
The following maps include data provided from the governments of Germany and Austria 
regarding their leading PRR parties and their percentage of support in each of their provinces 
prior to the 2015 Syrian migration wave, as well as after the 2015 migration wave.  
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Figure 3.1: German General Election Results for the AfD Party in 2013 (left) and 2017 (right) 
(Data sources: Govdata - Das Datenportal für Deutschland and Bundeswahlleiter 2017) 
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Figure 3.2: Results of the Austrian General Election in 2013 showing FPO Support (top) and 
2017 (bottom) 
(Source: Austrian Ministry of the Interior 2013 and 2017)  
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3.2 Data Analysis and Results  
 
 The clear differences pre and post-2015 display a spike in support of PRR groups, 
coming at time after mass migration of Syrians, and the rise of anti-immigration rhetoric. In both 
Austria and Germany, provinces lacking a national capital or a major, populous city were 
typically more supportive of PRR groups, whereas more urban cities or capital areas, including 
Berlin and Vienna, the support for PRR groups were at the lowest before and after 2015.  
 
 The said causes that have contributed to the rise of PRR groups in Germany and Austria 
are economic and historical divisions and events that have shaped regional support and 
influenced voters. They Syrian conflict did not create these divisions in Germany and Austria. 
The effects of the Syrian conflict on migration related debates and political discourse exists 
because of past tensions and divisions since the fall of Nazi Germany (including Austria), 
followed by the reunification of East and West Germany. These contributing factors have led to 
the current political state in both countries, where the AfD has gained significant support since 
2013, and the FPO and OVP have also gained support in the 2017 election in Austria.  
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Chapter Four: 
 
Analysis and Recommendations 
 
4.1 Gastarbeiter (Guest Worker) Agreements Reapplied in the 21st Century 
 
Germany and Austria have both previously experienced a wave of economically 
motivated migration, primarily the post-war "Gastarbeiter" Agreements (guest worker 
agreements) of the 1960s, which allowed low-skilled migrants from Eastern Europe and the 
Middle East to temporarily relocate to Germany, and some in Austria, to in turn help support the 
development of the economy (Schmid 1983). Although an economic crisis abruptly ended these 
bi-lateral agreements between Germany and guest worker supplying countries, the ongoing wave 
of migration in the 21st century in Germany has been re-initiated due to another external crisis.  
 
A common debate circling countries experiencing mass migration flows, such as 
Germany, is whether migration encourages development for migrant receiving countries or, 
contrariwise, impedes such development. Furthermore, this argument has more or less created a 
bi-lateral debate between those who believe that migration eventually brings ‘brain gain’, 
growth, and prosperity to host countries, and those who believe that migration causes a ‘brain 
drain’ and destabilizes development by wearing human and financial resources in the host 
country. The policies of development economists in the 1950s and 1960s stressed that labor 
migration was not only integral, but also a positive part of modernization. Governments, like 
Germany, have considered migration as a key instrument that fosters economic development; 
therefore, they have previously signed agreements, such as the guest worker migration 
agreement.  
  39
It was not until the Oil Crisis of 1973 that a new wave of migration sentiments began to 
predominantly assert that migration undermined local economic prospects for successful 
development, and can instead lead to potential stagnation and dependency due to the burden of 
incoming migrants (Castles, et. al 2014). More or less, the current bilateral debate surrounding 
global politics has roots in past historical involvements, such as positive impacts of guest worker 
agreements and negative impacts of economic crises. These agreements can be modified and 
reinstated to support the influx of Syrian refugees in both Austria and Germany. 
 
4.1.1 Guest Worker Agreements and Migration Policy Recommendations: Case of New 
Zealand 
Labor markets play a central role in migration, and the impacts of economically 
motivated migration are felt in destination and origin countries alike. Employers and organized 
labor, alongside international actors and states, profoundly shape migration policies, particularly 
for temporary migrant worker programs, such as seasonal worker programs or guest worker 
agreements. Seasonal worker programs are increasingly playing a greater role in migration and 
development policies, and nearly all OECD countries have comparable working programs. 
Seasonal working programs are extremely unique because they inherently allow low-skilled 
workers to benefit from working temporarily in high-income countries. Countries with guest 
worker programs have included the United Kingdom, the Republic of Korea, Italy, and Canada; 
however, New Zealand’s Recognized Seasonal Employer (RSE) program was one of the first of 
these programs specifically designed with an economically progressive perspective.  
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The World Bank Development Research Group produced research regarding New 
Zealand’s approach to policy facilitation as conducted by aid agencies and the government 
throughout the RSE program. Similar to many working agreements in other OECD countries, the 
RSE program was created to meet New Zealand’s labor needs while simultaneously boosting 
economic development in the Pacific region. The data exhibits a high grade of complexity in 
worker movements with little displacement of New Zealand workers. The migrant workers were 
shown to be more productive than local workers, and additionally the migrant workers were 
shown to gain productivity after returning for the following seasons.  
 
 The RSE program is an exceptional example in calculating migration policy development 
and economic impact of workers agreements for this research, and the ILO has stated that the 
RSE program in New Zealand “could service as a model for other [migrant] destination 
countries.” (p.4). The rapid growth of horticulture and viticulture industries in New Zealand 
created the demand for migrant workers during a time when unemployment was relatively low in 
the country.  
 
The negative impact of such programs included in the report included an annual loss of 
NZ$ 180-300 million due to lack of training and poor quality labor. An important factor in 
measuring cost of temporary workers programs must include policies that address these losses. 
The New Zealand government addressed this issue in 2004 by allowing temporary seasonal work 
permits for the 2005-2006 year, and by developing a hierarchy of countries, including a “New 
Zealanders first” standard (Gibson, et. al 2014).  
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If countries such as Germany and Austria responded to refugee and mass migration 
related economic concerns in similar ways, including guideline of past guest worker programs, 
then the placement of Syrians within EU states would be a win-win situation for both EU 
member state citizens, as well as Syrians. Although the guest worker model may be difficult to 
implement in a conflict situation instead of an economically motivated migration wave, this does 
not mean that elements of the guest worker model cannot be included in future policies. 
Germany and Austria would benefit from creating policies that allow Syrians to obtain visas for 
apprenticeship-like programs that will provide intensive training in areas including tourism, 
manufacturing, education, and more. Although it would be difficult to apply this model as a 
long-term solution, this would help Syrian migrants settle in Europe and provide them with a 
livable wage in the short term.  
 
4.1.2 Skill Sensitive Recommendations for Future Migration Policies  
The Rand corporation conducted a study researching mutually beneficial opportunities 
for Syrians in labor markets. The study is funded by the Qatar Fund for Development and was 
built on previous data provided by the UN, and the governments of Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon. 
Using interviews, surveys, and focus groups, the research has determined the existing skill sets 
of Syrian refugees and how to effectively incorporate them in the resettlement process while 
overcoming the burdens and limitations of some policies. 
 
The study found that the biggest obstacles Syrians face in the job seeking and hiring 
process after resettlement are the reluctances of companies to pay the extra fees for sponsoring a 
foreign national. This causes major issues for Syrians, because those with higher skillsets end up 
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working illegally at lower skill jobs for lower wages, thus creating the poverty cycle associated 
with refugees displaced abroad (Kumar, et. al 2018). Therefore, of the biggest problems with EU 
and UN policies alike, are that they focus too much on short-term humanitarian aid and 
assistance, and not enough on long-term resettlement and job opportunities for Syrians. For 
example, in Turkey although efforts to start vocational programs to transition Syrian refugees 
into the workforce have begun, as of 2018 only 200,000 of the 3.6 million registered refugees 
have taken part in such programs. This means in Turkey only about 5% of Syrian refugees have 
successfully completed a vocational program, leaving the remainder 95% without marketable 
skills or job opportunities.  
 
According to the Rand corporation, Syrian refugees abroad mainly work low skill, low 
wage jobs, and a majority of them are not using their professional skills after resettlement 
abroad. Discrimination, legal status, language barriers, alongside other hitches complicates job 
opportunities for refugees, and migration programs provided by EU member states and the UN 
must address professional roadblocks after resettlement. In future policy development, it is vital 
that policy makers prioritize Syrian skill sets and provide adequate programs that will ease them 
into German and Austrian societies. Policies should include apprenticeships or accelerated 
training programs in areas such as medicine, education, business, and tourism that would benefit 
refugees seeking a stable wage in a known career, while they provide marketable skills in both 
countries.   
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4.2 Private Funding of Refugee Resettlement: Case of Canada 
 
While the rise of right-wing populist parties that espouse anti-immigration and populist 
views is the cause of multiple events, there rise during the peak of the European migration crisis 
fundamentally altered the way in which refugee resettlement can be approached.  
 
For example, during the conflict in Bosnia in 1991 and 1992, many European countries 
handled the events quite differently, with the mainstream public discourse sympathizing with the 
large number of refugees coming in a short period of time. The current crisis has diverged far 
from being viewed as a national, but solvable crisis. Instead the Syrian conflict overlapped with 
civil strife across the Middle East, North Africa, West Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Civil 
wars, insurgencies, and economic problems led many to head to Europe for stability and security. 
This altered the conversation that was being held about refugees, as they were considered a small 
part of a larger wave of “economic migrants.” Specific events that occurred throughout Western 
Europe around 2015 drove public opinion against refugees and migrants. Coupled with some 
European countries refusing to allow many refugees, and building fences to divert the traditional 
flow through the Balkans and into Western Europe, some nations like Canada altered their 
methods to a far more proactive refugee resettlement method. 
 
Privately sponsored refugee programs appear to be the best viable option for both 
refugees and policy makers. The model was first developed in the 1970s in Canada following the 
Indochina refugee crisis, which left approximately 1,000,000 people displaced. Between the 
years 1969 and 1970, Canada resettled approximately 60,000 people, with around half of which 
being sponsored privately by Canadians. Since its inception, the program has resettled 
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approximately 280,000 people. Canada requires individuals or sponsorship groups to register as 
privately sponsored refugees (PSR). These PSR’s provide refugees with helping them find a 
place to live, provide financial support, provide emotional support, and give food and clothing 
(Government of Canada 2018).  
 
The PSR method has also stayed relatively popular amongst Canadians despite there 
being relatively negative discussions of refugee and migrant groups in the Canadian media, 
alongside international media. PSR appears to be more successful in integrating refugees better 
than Government Assisted Refugees numbers wise. Additionally, it has been successful at 
unifying families. When accepting families, the Canadian government recognizes only a nuclear 
family with, “up to two adults and their non-adult children.” Privately sponsored refugees can 
work to provide resettlement to other refugee family members that might have not been resettled 
otherwise (Hyndman, et. al 2017).  
 
While some have argued that private refugee sponsorship removes the responsibility of 
governments to assist in refugee aid and resettlement, countries in Europe have shown that 
relying on the goodwill of these governments is a slow and risky process. 
 
Parties who espouse PRR ideologies have won many seats in European national 
governments, the EU Parliament, heads of national governments, and ran candidates who have 
come close to victory for offices of President or Prime Minister. Therefore, privately sponsored 
refugees can lessen the false burden many anti-immigrant and anti-refugee parties espouse, 
primarily the economic burden and their arguments against integration of refugees. The victory 
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of anti-immigrants and anti-refugee parties in Europe tend to be unpredictable, therefore the 
international community must temporarily not rely on the good will of opposing PRR groups as 
it has done in the past. By being conscious of the negative reactions amongst the populace of 
these host countries, international organizations and NGOs can help resettle and help integrate 
refugees in larger numbers more successfully.  
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Chapter Five: 
Conclusion 
 The research and analysis of previous and current migration issues that have directly 
affected Germany and Austria in the 20th and 21st century were taken into account, alongside 
methods of geographical study to determine if PRR groups are a result of mass migration after 
major conflicts, and how their political influence can be contended with the recommendations 
provided in this paper. The results from this paper show a distinct rise of PRR support in both 
Germany and Austria, as well as other European states, after the start of the Syrian crisis and 
directly after migration peaked in both countries. 
 
 The results of this research can assist international organizations, primarily including the 
UN, as well as government bodies, NGOs, and private organizations, to contribute to the refugee 
crisis to combat the rise of ineffective PRR migration rhetoric and policies. For future policy and 
academic research, it would be advisable to invest time and capital in developing long-term, 
economic goals that are viable for Syrian refugees who have resettled abroad, instead of solely 
focusing on short-term, humanitarian efforts.  
 
 Although there has been significant progress in assisting refugees, asylum seekers, and all 
other migrants fleeing conflict, we hope to learn from the impact and consequences of previous 
conflicts and policies, particularly in Germany and Austria, so that past policies and practices do 
not repeat themselves.  
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